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Abstract
We develop a model of one representative agent and one asset. The
agent evaluates the earnings according to Prospect Theory and he does
not know exactly the stochastic process generating earnings. While
the earnings are generated by a random walk process, the agent con-
siders a Markovian process, according to which firm’s earnings move
between two regimes, represented by a mean-reverting process and a
trend process, as in Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). We study
how an agent who is loss averse evaluates the price of a stock when
she takes into account the wrong stochastic process. This twofold de-
parture from rationality determines permanent eﬀects on stock prices,
even in long run. First, the model shows that agent who evaluates
the asset according to Prospect Theory consistently underestimates
the asset, due to loss aversion bias. This is shown under two diﬀerent
assumption regarding the functional form of utility. A kinked linear
utility function (as in Bernatzi and Thaler, 1985) and the original and
more general specification of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) are used.
The model allows to explain observed phenomenon in the cross-section
earnings return distribution. We solve this model and according to
Barberis et all (1998), we evaluate the framework by using artificial
data sets of earnings and prices simulated from the model. For plau-
sible range of parameter values, it generates the empirical predictions
of overreaction and underreaction observed in the data are explained.
JEL:G12, G14
Key words: Investor sentiment, Loss Aversion, Overreaction, Un-
derreaction
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1 Introduction
Behavioral Finance attempts at explaining some observed financial phenom-
enon by studying models in which agents are not fully rational. The depar-
tures from traditional paradigm used by Behavioral Finance literature are
mainly two: on one side beliefs are not assumed to be formed according to
standard rational Bayesian paradigm and on the other, preferences are not
consistent with subjective expected utility. The present paper tries at estab-
lishing a connection between these two strands of literature: the one based
on beliefs and the other one based on changes in preferences. Here we try to
investigate the eﬀect of the interaction between diﬀerent psychological biases
exhibited by individuals on asset prices. The paper is motivated by experi-
mental evidence both of cognitive psychology and experimental economics.
We develop a model of one representative agent and one asset. The
agent evaluates the earnings according to Prospect Theory and she does not
know exactly the stochastic process generating earnings. While the earnings
are generated by a random walk process, the agent considers a Markovian
process, according to which firm’s earnings move between two regimes, rep-
resented by a mean-reverting process and a trend process, as in Barberis,
Shleifer and Vishny (1998). We study how an agent who is loss averse eval-
uates the price of a stock when she takes into account the wrong stochastic
process. In this paper we address these issues by developing an asset pricing
model endowed with prospect theory.
The design of the model is compatible with main evidence from psychol-
ogy literature. On one side, the idea that people care about changes in fi-
nancial wealth and they exhibit loss aversion over wealth changes constitutes
a central feature of Prospect Theory, used here to describe the preferences
of the agent in this single-agent economy. On the other side, the model tries
at capturing cognitive limitation exhibited by agents in the task of process-
ing information. In particular, they follow representativeness and anchoring
heuristics in the formation of beliefs regarding the earnings process.
We show that this twofold departure from rationality determines perma-
nent eﬀects on stock prices, even in long run. The stock price deviates from
the one under full rationality for the presence of two biases: one captures
the eﬀect on the stock price due to the systematic error in the beliefs regard-
ing the stochastic process underlying the earnings; the second eﬀect on the
stock price is due to loss aversion. Under the first characterization we use a
kinked linear utility function, according to Bernatzi and Thaler (1985) and
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we show that an agent who evaluates the asset according to Prospect Theory
consistently underevaluates the asset, because of the presence of loss aversion
bias. Under the second functional form, we take into account the diminishing
sensitivity attitude, modelled under the assumption of concavity over gains
and convexity over losses as in the original specification of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). We show that the stock price can be both undervalued and
overvalued: since even gains are weighted proportionally more, the devia-
tion from the fundamental price can go in both directions, depending on the
sequence of realised earnings.
Secondly, the model allows to explain observed phenomenon in the cross-
section earnings return distribution. We solve this model and according to
Barberis et all (1998), we evaluate the framework by using artificial data sets
of earnings and prices simulated from the model. This allows to show that,
for plausible range of parameter values, it generates the empirical predictions
of overreaction and underreaction observed in the data, as pointed out by a
number of empirical studies on U.S. market.
2 Related literature
The present work is closely related with the literature on Behavioral Finance.
Broadly speaking, behavioral finance attempts at explaining some observed
financial phenomenon by studying models in which agents are not fully ratio-
nal. Behavioral Finance turns to extensive experimental evidence compiled
by cognitive psychologists on the systematic biases exhibited by persons on
preferences and how they form beliefs. In particular, the behavioral finance
literature departs from traditional paradigm mainly in two ways: on one side
beliefs are not assumed to be formed according to probability theory, as for
example Bayes’ law and on the other, preferences are not consistent with
subjective expected utility. The paper tries at establishing a connection be-
tween these two strands of literature: the one based on beliefs and the other
one based on changes in preferences. We examine this issue in the context of
a finance application.
Regarding departures from Bayesian beliefs, a number of works have tried
to incorporate psychological biases exhibited by persons when assessing the
likelihood of an event into analytical frameworks. Barberis, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998), which constitutes one of the main beliefs-based model, is the
paper more directly related to the present work. Barberis et all study how an
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agent evaluates the price of a stock when she makes systematic errors when
using public information to form expectations of future cash flows. In par-
ticular the authors address the question considering an agent that takes into
account the wrong stochastic process. They build a model that incorporates
two updating biases, known as conservatism, which indicates the tendency to
underweight new information relative to priors and representativeness, in the
version of the law of small numbers, which captures the tendency to make
too much inference from small samples, since people expect even small sam-
ples to exhibit the properties of the parent population. Barberis et all show
that these departures from rationality determine permanent eﬀects on stock
prices, even in long run and allow to explain observed phenomenon in the
cross-section earnings return distribution. In particular, the introduction of
these biases explains the phenomenon of underreaction and overreaction ob-
served empirically on cross-section of average returns. Another beliefs-based
model, which attempts at explaining the same empirical evidence, is the work
of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001) which focus attention
on the presence of biases in the interpretation of private information, instead
of public information.
Regarding departures from ”standard preferences”, Prospect Theory de-
veloped by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) has been widely used within the
paradigm of alternative behavior under uncertainty. Bernatzi and Thaler
(1995) constitues the first attempt to use loss aversion to explain the well
known equity premium puzzle1, which simply says that investors demand a
high premium in order to hold stocks, despite stocks oﬀer high average returns
and a low covariance with consumption. Bernatzi and Thaler (1995) exam-
ine how an agent characterized by preferences modelled a la Prospect theory
allocates her financial wealth optimally between T-bills and the stock mar-
ket, estimating the portfolio evaluation period to be one year. The so-called
”myopic loss aversion”, i.e. the combination of loss aversion and frequent
evaluations of portofolio returns, is the key element used to explain the eq-
uity premium puzzle: investors require a high premium as a compensation for
risk if they are loss averse over annual changes in financial wealth, since they
fear large drops in financial wealth evaluated each year. Barberis, Huang
and Santos (2001) develop a dynamic equilibrium model of stock returns,
where the Bernatzi and Thaler (1995) framework constitutes the building
1This phenomenon has been called equity premium puzzle since the work of Mehra and
Prescott (1985), who first noticed and studied it.
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block. The investors get utility both from consumption and changes in the
value of holdings of the risky asset over a period of one year. In particular,
they modify the utility function introducing a state variable keeping tracks
of past gains and losses and anchoring to this state variable the parameter
which measures sensitivity to losses. This is successful in explaining both the
volatility puzzle and the equity premium puzzle.
3 Some psychological evidence
The model presented here is motivated by empirical evidence of cognitive
psychology, that documents a number of cognitive biases displayed by peo-
ple when they are asked to form beliefs and make decisions given their beliefs.
The cognitive limitations taken into account in the formal model are repre-
sentativeness heuristic and conservatism regarding biases on beliefs and loss
aversion related to biases on preferences.
According to the representativeness heuristic, identified by Kahneman
and Tversky (1974), people evaluate the probability that a data set A was
generated by a model B or that an object A belongs to a class B accord-
ing to the degree by which A reflects the characteristics of B or is similar
to B. Despite being useful in order to reduce the evaluation process to sim-
pler tasks, the representativeness heuristics may cause biases which aﬀect
substantially estimates and beliefs assessments. A bias generated by repre-
sentativeness is constitued by the base rate neglect, that arises when people
are asked to assess the conditional probability of an event. In fact, people
applying the representativeness heuristics, underestimate the probability of
the conditioned event (base rate). To illustrate this bias, Kahneman and
Tversky (1974) asked subjects in the sample to assess which event is more
likely on the basis of a given description. The two events are: a person named
Linda is ”a bank teller” (statement A) or ”a bank teller and is active in the
feminist movement”(statement B). The description on Linda’s personality
assigned to subjects in the experiment is as follows:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned
with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also partici-
pated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
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Subjects typically assign greater probability to B, showing a clear viola-
tion of Bayes’ law. This can be explained in the light of representativeness
heuristic: people consider Linda’s description representative of a feminist
and therefore they put too much weight on the resemblance of Linda with
statement B, despite the fact that statement B is the union event, and hence
less likely than the single event belonging to the union, according to standard
probability theory. In fact, subjects tend to overweight Linda’s description,
because of the close matching up with the idealized view of a ”feminist” and
as a consequence, they underestimate the statistical base rate evidence of the
fraction of population belonging to this profession.
Another bias is represented by the sample size neglect, according to which
people do not take into account (fully) the size of the sample from which ob-
servations are drawn when estimating the probability of an event and believe
that even small samples can reflect the properties of the parent population.
This means that people believe that a small sample can be representative as
a large one. In literature, this belief is known as the ”law of small numbers”,
as in Rabin (2002). The implication is that people tend to infer too quickly
on the basis of the sample information on the data generating process.
When forming their beliefs, people exhibit another deviation relative to
standard Bayesian rationality, known as conservatism, identified by Edwards
(1968), according to which people tend to underweight the statistical base
rate relative to sample evidence. When sample evidence does not allow to
recognize easily the data generating process, people react too little to sample
evidence and they tend to rely too much on their priors. In particular, accord-
ing to experimental psychological evidence, people update their posteriors in
the right direction, but in an insuﬃcient way relative to the predictions of
standard Bayesian theory.
In the present work we are interested in the representativeness heuristic
and conservatism because they oﬀer a behavioral alternative explanation to
observed empirical phenomenon in the cross-section earnings return distrib-
ution. As pointed out in Barberis et all (1998), representativeness heuristic
and the law of small numbers can be considered suggestive of the observed
empirical financial phenomenon of overreaction. Financial overreaction stems
from the fact that individuals do react too much to long and consistent strings
of information on firms’ earnings. Following the representativeness heuristic,
individuals consider a consistent long sequence of positive (negative) infor-
mation representative of a positive (negative) trend on firm’s growth rate.
This is due to the fact that people recognize ”order in chaos”, i.e. they
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believe to see patterns in a truly random sequence and consequently, they
infer incorrectly that the earnings are expected to grow in the future at the
same positive (negative) rate. This pushes prices up (down) too much in
case of a positive (negative) news sequence; as a consequence, firms become
over(under)valued and investors earn lower (higher) rates of return on their
investment than the expected ones. This generates the phenomenon of finan-
cial overreaction. On the other hand, conservatism appears to be suggestive
of the observed empirical phenomenon of underreaction. When investors re-
ceive a good (negative) piece of information on firm’s earnings, they tend to
disregard the information to be noisy, for example because it contains many
temporary components. Therefore, investors rely more on their initial firm’s
evaluation and update their beliefs only by too little. Consequently, in case
of positive (negative) news, returns rate on investment will be higher (lower)
than the expected one, generating underreaction2.
Empirical evidence from cognitive psychology shows that individuals ex-
hibit biases relative not only to standard Bayesian rationality, but even with
respect to expected utility theory. Prospect theory, developed by the sem-
inal contribution of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), incorporates into indi-
vidual’s preferences some of the main observations made by psychology on
human behaviour, among which particular relevance is given to the presence
of reference points, loss aversion, status quo bias and diminishing sensitivity.
Loss aversion indicates the tendency of individuals to evaluate the disutility
deriving from a loss more than the utility assigned to a same sized gain.
The notion of loss aversion3 does not coincide with the one of risk aversion:
while the latter is modelled through the concavity of the utility function,
loss aversion is taken into account in the utility function by introducing a
kink, i.e a non diﬀerentiable point. The kink is fixed in correspondence to
the reference point, where the slope of the utility function changes sharply,
2Mullainathan (2001) develops an economic model trying to fit together conservatism
and representativeness heuristic, despite the fact that these two biases appear to move
into opposite directions.
3Rabin and Thaler (2001) suggest to incorporate loss aversion to overcome the theoret-
ical problem presented by expected utility theory and pointed out by Calibration Theorem
(Rabin 2000). Loss aversion allows to explain the so-called ”first order risk aversion”, which
indicates the presence of an intense risk aversion in lotteries of modest entity. A concave
utility function implies the so-called ”second order risk aversion”, measured through the
well-known Arrow-Pratt index, according to which a significative risk aversion is recorded
in lotteries of large entity and a substantial neutrality towards risk in lotteries of small
dimensions.
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capturing the higher weight assigned by preferences to losses with respect to
gains. Prospect theory inserts explicitly the presence of the so-called refer-
ence points into the functional form of utility. Psychological studies show
that individuals evaluate their satisfaction level not in terms of an absolute
evaluation of reached result, but in relative terms with respect to desired or
expected results. The utility experienced by an agent from her consumption
activity depends on the reference point she takes into account, for example
the level of past consumption or the future one, estimated on the basis of
her expectations. Besides loss aversion, psychological evidence documents
the phenomenon of ”diminishing sensitivity”, according to which the mar-
ginal utility derived from a gain (net of the reference point) diminuishes as
the gain increases. This implies that the utility function of monetary wealth
results to be concave over the region of gains and convex over the region of
losses. Therefore, an agent exhibits an attitude of risk aversion towards gains
and a preference for risk loving with respect to losses. The utility function
is S-shaped, whose slope diminishes the further the wealth level gets from
the reference point. Prospect theory conjugates analytical tractability with
empirical evidence on psychological studies and explanatory power of evi-
dence from experimental economics. For these reasons, the utility function
according to prospect theory is used in a number of economic applications, in
order to evaluate the economic implications of the hypothesis of loss aversion
in various frameworks of choice.
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4 A formal model
We examine a one-security pricing model with one representative agent. We
focus the attention only on the demand side of the market.
The formal setting presented here is analogous to the one of Barberis
et all (1998). The earnings of the security at time t are given by Nt =
Nt−1 + yt, where yt is a stochastic shock to earnings. We assume that all
earnings are paid out as dividends4. We assume that yt follows a random
walk. The investor does not know exactly the stochastic process generating
yt. In particular, we assume that she believes that yt can either take the
value +y or −y and is generated by one of the two models, described by the
following transition matrices.
Model 1 yt+1 = y yt+1 = −y
yt = y πL 1− πL
yt = −y 1− πL πL
Model 2 yt+1 = y yt+1 = −y
yt = y πH 1− πH
yt = −y 1− πH πH
Both models are a one-period Markov process, where the earnings shock
at period t+1, yt+1, depends only on the shock occured in the previous period,
at t. The two processes diﬀer in the transition probabilities: Model 1 is apt
to describe a mean-reverting process, under the assumption 0 < πL < 0, 5
and Model 2 describes a trend process under the assumption 0, 5 < πH < 1.
Under these assumptions on the parameters, under Model 1, it is more likely
that a positive shock is followed by a negative one, while under Model 2 the
shocks tend to persist and therefore it is more likely that a shock of the same
sign occurs. Note that Model 1 is suggestive of conservatism, while Model 2
of representativeness heuristic.
The investor assumes to know the Markovian process, describing the tran-
sition fromModel 1 to Model 2, according to the realisations of the stochastic
variable yt. The Markovian process, described in the following matrix, is as-
sumed to be one period: the state of the world about which stochastic model
is believed to describe the evolution of yt is a function only of the state of
world in the previous period.
st+1 = 1 st+1 = 2
st = 1 1− λ1 λ1
st = 2 λ2 1− λ2
4Earnings and dividends are used indiﬀerently from now on.
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We denote the state of the world with st, which equals i = 1, 2 whenthe
investor believes Model i describes the pattern followed by yt. λi describes
the probability of transition from state i to state j, j 6= i, i.e. the probability
of switching between the two regimes. We assume λ2 to be higher than λ1,
which means that the investor thinks Model 1 is more likely to be the right
model describing the earnings generating process than Model 2. In the next
sections no results rely on this assumption.
In this model, there is no learning regarding the stochastic process gener-
ating earnings: the probabilistic structure of the model remains unchanged
since the investor believes to know exactly πH and πL. All agent’s learning
is about her beliefs regarding which state of the world is the true model gen-
erating earnings. The representative investor updates her beliefs about the
state of the world in a Bayesian way: she observes the earnings shock yt oc-
curred in each period and she calculates the probability of yt being generated
by Model 1, using the new observation to update her beliefs about Model 1
at date t− 1.
We label qt = Pr (st = 1 | yt, yt−1, qt−1) and qt+1 is calculated using Bayes’
rule. As shown in Barberis et all (1998),
qt+1 =
((1− λ1) qt + λ2 (1− qt)) Pr (yt−1 | st+1 = 1, yt)
((1− λ1) qt + λ2 (1− qt)) Pr (yt−1 | st+1 = 1, yt)
+ (λ1qt + (1− λ2) (1− qt)) Pr (yt−1 | st+1 = 2, yt)
(1)
If yt+1 exhibits same sign as the shock occured in period t,
qt+1 =
((1− λ1) qt + λ2 (1− qt))πL
((1− λ1) qt + λ2 (1− qt))πL + (λ1qt + (1− λ2) (1− qt))πH
(2)
If yt+1 exhibits opposite sign as the shock occured in period t,
qt+1 =
((1− λ1) qt + λ2 (1− qt)) (1− πL)
((1− λ1) qt + λ2 (1− qt)) (1− πL)
+ (λ1qt + (1− λ2) (1− qt)) (1− πH)
(3)
qt+1 decreases after a shock of the same sign, since the investor gives more
weight to Model 2, while it increases after a shock of opposite sign, which in
turns means that the investor assigns a higher weight to Model 1.
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4.1 Preferences
We depart from Barberis et all setting (1998) by endowing the investor with
a utility function a la Prospect theory.
We assume the agent evaluates dividends according to the following utility
function:
v (x) =
x if x ≥ xB
x+ l (x− xB) if x < xB (4)
The agent gets utility from two sources: the first term in this preference
specification represents utility over earnings x paid out by the firm, which is
a standard feature of asset pricing models. This is all the utility the agent
retrieves from her investment in case the realised earnings x are higher than
agent’s reference point x∗. In the opposite case, i.e. when realised earnings
are lower than the reference point, the investor experiences a loss, which
is proportional to the diﬀerential between realized earnings and reference
point by a factor l, interpreted as a measure of sensitivity to loss aversion.
The utility function is kinked at the reference point xB: this means that
the investor evaluates diﬀerently gains and losses. We assume l > 1, i.e.
the agent retrieves a higher level of disutility from a loss with respect to a
same sized gain. In other words, the utility function displays loss aversion,
which is increasing in the parameter l. Finally, note that we consider here
a simplified version of prospect theory utility function, which is reduced to
a kinked linear utility function, analogous to Bernatzi and Thaler (1995). A
diﬀerent framework will be considered in the next section, where the utility
function is allowed to be concave over gains and convex over losses, capturing
the attitude of diminishing sensitivity displayed by subjects in experimental
settings.
Introducing the presence of a reference point x∗ into the preference spec-
ification raises a delicate issue regarding which level of x∗ should be fixed.
The reference point x∗ can be interpreted as an aspiration level for the in-
vestor, i.e. the desired level of earnings needed to consider satisfyicing the
investment return. Otherwise x∗can be interpreted as the expected earnings
level paid out by the firm in each period. In the model presented here, we
set the reference level x∗ to be equal to y, the value of earnings in case of a
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positive realization5. This means that the investor aims at realising positive
dividends in each period. This is the highest reference level we could choose,
which is associated with the largest loss the agent can experience. Hence the
results stated in the following sections are robust to changes in the reference
point, since the only other reasonable x∗ the agent could choose would be
lower than y; for example the investor could fix her aspiration level equal
to the expected value of earnings6. Note that expected earnings would be
zero, if the investor takes into account the true stochastic process generating
earnings, a random walk model without drift.
Note that taking into account the stochastic process generating earnings
in the period t + i according to investor’s beliefs and setting the reference
point equal to y∗ = y, the utility function can take only two possible values:
v (yt+i) =
y if yt+i = y
−y (1 + 2l) if yt+i = −y
(5)
Note that the preference specification here does not introduce any form
of irrationality even if preferences are non standard; in fact, the agent ex-
periences utility from sources diﬀerent from earnings consumption, as the
psychological loss from failing to reach the aspiration level y∗.
4.2 Solution of the model
Within the framework of one representative agent and one security, the asset
price is given by agent’s evaluation of the asset. The price of the security
is given by the expected discounted utility of the dividends over the infinite
horizon:
Pt = Et
( ∞X
j=1
v (Nt+j)
(1 + δ)j
)
(6)
5Remember here that dividends can either take the value y or −y.
6Note that the expected earnings value paid by a firm in each period must belong to
the interval {−y; y}.
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Note that the expectations are taken over agent’s beliefs on the stochastic
process generating earnings. Because the agent doesn’t realize her mistake,
her evaluation of the security will diﬀer from the correct value of the asset,
in absence of loss aversion and errors in beliefs formation. The following
proposition shows the eﬀect of biases exhibited by the agent when evaluating
the security.
Proposition 1 The asset price satisfies
PPTt =
v (Nt)
δ
+ yt (p1 − p2qt)− 2lyt
³
p
0
1 − p
0
2qt
´
if yt > 0 (7)
PPTt =
v (Nt)
δ
+ yt (p1 − p2qt) + 2lyt
³
p
00
1 − p
00
2qt
´
if yt < 0 (8)
if we assume the investor believes that earnings act according to the
Markovian process described above and evaluates the earnings according to
Prospect Utility Function as in 5.
Proof. See Appendix.
The formula for Pt has the following explanation. In case the agent knows
that the earnings shock follows a random walk, the security price would sim-
ply reduce to
v (Nt)
δ
, the expected discounted utility associated with the
random walk process over the infinite horizon. The asset price deviates from
its fundamental value because of the presence of two biases, regarding beliefs
formation and loss aversion. Because the investor does not know the correct
stochastic process followed by earnings, the second term yt (p1 − p2qt) cap-
tures the systematic bias of the uninformed investor. Instead of a random
walk model, the investor uses a regime switching model to forecast earnings
The third component, either −2lyt
¡
p
0
1 − p
0
2qt
¢
if yt > 0 or 2lyt
¡
p
00
1 − p
00
2qt
¢
if
yt < 0, captures the bias due to loss aversion, as it is shown in Proposition
6.
According to a huge body of empirical evidence, overreaction and under-
reaction characterize the cross-section distribution of earnings returns. The
model presented here oﬀers an explanation of these empirical phenomena,
based on the bias exhibited by the agent when forming beliefs. The pres-
ence of the attitude of loss aversion does not undermine the channel through
which these phenomena are generated, even if it aﬀects the evaluation of the
security price.
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Overreaction occurs when the average return on firm’s stock after a con-
sistent series of good news is lower than the average return after a series of
negative announcements. In the model here, we need to define overreaction
in terms of a string of positive realizations of earnings shocks yt.
Definition 2 Overreaction means that the expected return following a series
of positive shocks is smaller than the expected return following a series of
negative shocks.
Et (Pt+1 − Pt | yt = yt−1 = ... = yt−j = y)−
Et (Pt+1 − Pt | yt = yt−1 = ... = yt−j = −y) < 0 (9)
When a positive series of good news is announced (or a long string of
positive earnings is realized), the investor tends to believe that that firm
belongs to a subset of ”good companies”, whose earnings are assumed to
grow at a positive rate even in the future. By using the representativeness
heuristics, she regards the trend process, labelled as Model 2, more likely
to describe the true earnings generating process. This pushes the security
price up, above the true evaluation. Since earnings shocks follow a random
walk, negative realizations will occur, contradicting investor’s optimism and
as a consequence, the investor gets a lower return from the security after a
series of positive news. This is a clear violation of the semi-strong form of
market eﬃciency, since the investor may realise positive profits using stale
information and trading the security after the earnings announcement. Early
studies as Poterba and Summers (1988) and Cutler et all (1991) discover
evidence of negative autocorrelation in stock returns over horizons of three
to five years and predictability of returns on the basis of book to market
ratio. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find that stocks with a long series of poor
returns over a period of three years oﬀer consistently higher returns than
stocks with very high returns. The result is robust to changes in the measure
of stock evaluation, as the ratio of market value to cash flow or market value
to book value of assets.
Underreaction occurs when the average return on a firm’s stock following
a positive earnings announcement is higher than the average return after a
bad news. In the model presented here, we need to define underreaction in
terms of a single positive realization of the earnings shock.
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Definition 3 Underreaction means that the expected return following one
positive shock is higher than the expected return following one negative shock
Et (Pt+1 − Pt | yt = y)− Et (Pt+1 − Pt | yt = −y) > 0 (10)
After observing a single good news, the investor tends to disregard the
information contained in the news as noisy, by using conservatism. As a
consequence, the stock underreacts to the announcement of a single good
news; in the subsequent periods the mistake is partially corrected and the
price of the security goes up gradually. The investor realises therefore a pos-
itive return. Bernard (1992) finds that U.S. stocks with higher standardized
unexpected earnings (SUE)7 earn higher returns in the period after the an-
nouncement; this means that agents underreact to earnings news and stale
information on SUE has predictive power for future stock returns, a violation
of the semi-strong market eﬃciency hypothesis. In the same direction points
the evidence elaborated by Jeedgadesh and Titman (1993), which shows a
positive autocorrelation between a cross section of U.S. stock returns over a
period of six month due to a slow incorporation of information into prices
and hence due to underreaction.
Proposition 4 The price function determined in Proposition 1 exhibits both
underreaction and overreaction under the same conditions stated in Barberis
et all.
Proof. See Appendix
The following proposition stated and proved in Barberis et all (1998)
gives the conditions for underreaction and overreaction on the parameters
underlying the model, such that conditions 9 and 10 are satisfied.
Proposition 5 Proposition 2 in Barberis et all (1998)
Suppose the underlying parameters πL, πH, λ1 and λ2 satisfy
kp2 < p1 < kp2,
p2 ≥ 0,
where
7Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) is defined as the diﬀerence between a firm’s
earnings in a given quarter and its earnings during the quarter a year before, scaled by
the standard deviation of firm’s earnings.
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k = q + 1
2
∆
¡
q
¢
,
k = qe + 1
2
(c1 + c2q∗) ,
c1 =
∆
¡
q
¢
q −∆ (q) q
q − q
c2 =
∆ (q) q −∆
¡
q
¢
q − q
q∗ =
qe if c2 < 0
qe if c2 ≥ 0
where qe and qe are bounds on the unconditional mean of the random
variable qt. Then the conditions for both underreaction and overreaction are
satisfied.
Proof. See Barberis et all (1998).
Here we show that the introduction of loss aversion aﬀects the evaluation
of the stock with permanent eﬀects. The eﬀect on the price of the security
is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Under the assumption that the investor evaluates earnings
according to Prospect Utility Function as in 5 and under the condition that
guarantees both underreaction and overreaction, the security price is always
underevalued with respect to the evaluation assigned by a risk neutral investor.
Proof. See Appendix.
From the comparison we obtain the result that the stock price is always
undervalued with respect to a risk neutral investor. The intuition comes
straightly from the fact that for each probability structure, i.e. for any real-
ization of investor’s beliefs, the loss averse agent is assigning a negative weight
to losses, a weight higher than the one assigned to a same-sized gain. Be-
cause of the negative weight given to losses, the loss-averse investor always
has lower evaluation of the security according to Kahneman and Tversky
prospect theory. This comes from the fact that the investor tends to as-
sign more weight to the trend model and regards positive results to be more
likely than negative results; because of the negative weight assigned to losses,
a lower evaluation of the stock under prospect theory is induced. In case of
underreaction, exactly the opposite phenomenon occurs: negative results are
regarded more likely than the positive ones.
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5 A diﬀerent set-up
In this section we address the question on the role of loss aversion in the eval-
uation of asset price in a diﬀerent framework. Here we consider a model with
one representative agent and one security, as in the previous section and we
define agent’s preferences by incorporating the attitude of diminishing sensi-
tivity. On one side, we move closer to the original Kahneman and Tversky’s
specification (1979), and we fit better with psychological evidence describing
attitude towards risk. On the other, a kinked linear utility function allows
to obtain sharper predictions on agent’s evaluation of security, because of a
simpler structure of the model.
5.1 The utility function
We consider the following specification of the prospect theory utility function.
Besides loss aversion, we observe the phenomenon of ”diminishing sensitiv-
ity”, according to which the marginal utility deriving from a gain (net of
the reference point) diminuishes as the gain increases8. This implies that
the utility function of monetary wealth results to be concave on the region
of gains and convex on the region of losses. Therefore, an agent exhibits an
attitude of risk aversion towards gains and a preference for risk loving with
respect to losses. The utility function is S-shaped, whose slope diminishes
the further the wealth level gets from the reference point.
Analytically, we consider the following expression:
v (x) =
xα if x ≥ 0
(−λ)xα if x < 0 (11)
With no loss of generality, we assume α is an even number. This is a sim-
plification with respect to the original formulation of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979): while we modify directly the agent’s evaluation of utility retrieved
from earnings taking into account the attitude of loss aversion and diminish-
ing sensitivity, we do not introduce any nonlinear probability transformation
to capture the tendency of individuals to overweight small probabilities.
8The phenomenon of diminishing sensitivity can be explained by the following ”real
life” example given by Kahneman and Tversky (ANNO). ”It is easier to distinguish the
diﬀerence between a change of 3
◦
and a change 6
◦
of degrees in room temperature than it
is to discriminate between a change of 13
◦
and a change of 16
◦
”.
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According to the functional form in 11, earnings are evaluated in terms of
gains and losses with respect to a reference point and each individual assigns
to losses a higher weight than to same sized gains, exhibiting therefore loss
aversion. We assume λ > 1. The utility function has a kink (a non diﬀer-
entiable point) in correspondence to the reference point, where the marginal
value of a loss is larger than the marginal value of a same sized gain. The
phenomenon of diminishing sensitivity is guaranteed by the power function,
which requires the utility function to be S-shaped so that the individual is
risk loving on the region of losses and risk averse on the region of gains.
5.2 Solution of the model
Within the framework of one representative agent and one security, the price
of the stock is calculated as the expected discounted value of utility of earn-
ings. The following Proposition oﬀers a general expression of the price of
the security. Note that the general formulation of the utility function in 11
does not allow any more to simplify the problem as in the previous section,
since we lose the addivity in the payoﬀs, due to the non-linearity in earnings
of the utility function.
Proposition 7 If the investor believes that the process generating earnings
shocks satisfies the Markovian process described above and she evaluates the
earnings according to Prospect Theory utility function as in 11, the price of
the security satisfies the following equation:
PPTt =
∞X
j=1
jX
k=0
(−λ)I [kyt + (j − k) (−yt)]α
(1 + δ)j
·
µ
j
k
¶Ã kY
i=1
γ0Qiqt
!Ã
j+1Y
i=k+1
γ0Qiqt
!
(12)
where I is the indicator function which takes the value 0 if [ky + (j + 1− k) (−y)] ≥
0 and 1 if [ky + (j + 1− k) (−y)] < 0
Proof. See the appendix.
We notice immediately that Pt can either take negative or positive values,
while Pt would be zero if the investor uses the random walk process (under
the assumption Nt = 0). This is due to the specific version of the prospect
theory utility function used here.
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We need to show that there is no conclusive comparison with Shleifer
model, in case the agent is characterised by a prospect theory utility function
as in 11. In case the agent is risk neutral, the price of the security takes the
following expression:
PRNt =
∞X
j=1
jX
k=0
[kyt + (j − k) (−yt)]
(1 + δ)j
·
µ
j
k
¶Ã kY
i=1
γ0Qiqt
!Ã
j+1Y
i=k+1
γ0Qiqt
!
(13)
After some calculations, it is possible to show that the diﬀerence between
the two prices can be expressed as follows:
PPTt − PRNt =
∞X
j=1
1
(1 + δ)j
·
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
j
2P
k=0
(−λ) (2k − j) (−y)
£
((2k − j) (−y))α−1 − 1
¤ · ¡jk¢µ kQ
i=1
γ0Qiqt
¶µ
j+1Q
i=k+1
γ0Qiqt
¶
+
jP
k= j
2
+1
(2k − j) y
£
((2k − j) y)α−1 − 1
¤ · ¡jk¢µ kQ
i=1
γ0Qiqt
¶µ
j+1Q
i=k+1
γ0Qiqt
¶
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(14)
From the inspection of 14 it appears clearly that it is not possible to
predict whether the price in case the agent displays loss aversion will be
undervalued or overvalued than the one under risk neutrality.
5.3 Some simulation results
In this section we evaluate numerically the model presented above, since
we do not obtain any conclusive results in terms of comparison between
security price under prospect theory and risk neutrality. We run a simulation
analogous to the one of Barberis et all (1998). We simulate artificial data
sets of earnings and prices from our model. We choose parameters values to
satisfy conditions to generate overreaction and underreaction, as stated in
Proposition 5. We fix πH = 13 so that Model 1 is a mean-reverting model
and πL = 34 a trend model. Moreover, we assume λ1 = 0.1 and λ2 = 0.3 so
that the agent considers Model 1 to be more likely than Model 2. Finally,
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λ is assumed to be 2, 25 according to Kahneman and Tversky’s empirical
estimates; this indicates that losses are weighted more than double than
gains of same size.
We simulate a stream of earnings, using a binomial model that gives
earnings equal either to y or −y with a given probability. In alternative,
we generate earnings stream with a random walk process. We set the ini-
tial level of earnings N1 to be equal to zero and we generate 2,000 earnings
sequences. Each sequence corresponds to an hypothetical firm and is con-
stitued by six earnings realization. According to Bernatzi and Thaler (1995),
who estimated the average period for the evaluation of returns on financial
portfolio investment to be one year, we can interpret a period in the model
to coincide with one year, after which an earnings realization occurs. Given
the values chosen for the parameters, we use the simulated earnings data to
calculate prices and returns, according to the model presented in section 5.2.
We use the same data to generate prices and returns according to Barberis
et all (1998) model.
We address the question on the role of loss aversion when this attitude in-
terplays with the presence of psychological biases aﬀecting beliefs formation.
For each n period in the sample, from one to four, we form two portfolios.
One portfolio consists of all firms with positive earnings changes in every pe-
riod n considered in the sample, while the other is formed by all firms with
negative earnings changes in every period n. For each firm in each portfolio,
we calculate the diﬀerence between the two prices calculated according to
PPTt as in 12 and P
RN
t as in 13. The diﬀerence P
PT
t −PRNt results to be con-
sistently positive for each firm belonging to the first portfolio and negative
for each one in the second portfolio. We check the robustness of the results
under diﬀerent assumption on q, the prior probability that Model 1 describes
the true earnings generating process.
We calculate the diﬀerence between returns on the two portfolios in the
year after formation and in every of the subsequent n years in the sample.
Label the diﬀerence as rn+ − rn−. We observe the pattern expected for over-
reaction and underreaction. According to 10, the underreaction condition,
the average return following a positive earnings shock is greater than the
average return following a negative shock; the simulated data generates this
phenomenon in returns on portfolio. The diﬀerence becomes negative as the
number of shocks increases, satisfying the condition for overreaction stated
in 9.
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Earnings sort
r1+ − r1− 0.0522
r2+ − r2− 0.0245
r3+ − r3− −0.0175
r4+ − r4− −0.0478
(Table 1)
With respect to Barberis et all (1998), not only the magnitudes of the
numbers in the table are quite reasonable, but their absolute values are closer
to those found in the empirical literature. Note that we report only point
estimates, without addressing their statistic significance; we would need oth-
erwise to impose more structure, such as on the cross-sectional covariance
properties of earnings changes.
6 Concluding comments
We have presented a model of one security The model is motivated by psy-
chological evidence, in particular two are the main ideas which inspire the
framework: loss aversion as presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
the tendency of people to put too much weight on the strength of the evi-
dence presented and too little weight to its statistical weight. We show that
in case the utility function is modelled according to a kinked linear utility
function as in Bernatzi and Thaler (1992), the price is systematically under-
valued with respect to a risk neutral agent, who commits the same systematic
error when forming beliefs regarding the stochastic process generating earn-
ings. The deviation becomes unclear in case we model the preferences for
embedding the attitude of diminishing sensitivity. Simulation results show
that the price of the stock is overvalued after a suﬃciently long sequence of
positive results and undervalued after a suﬃciently long sequence of negative
stock earnings realization. Moreover, the model is consistent with empirical
evidence concerning underreaction and overreaction.
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7 Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 1. The asset price is given by the expected dis-
counted value of the utility of the earnings over the infinite horizon. Because
of the stochastic process generating earnings and because of the linearity
of the utility function, we can rewrite the expression of the price in the fol-
lowing way: Pt = Et
∙
v (Nt) + v (yt+1)
(1 + δ)
+
v (Nt) + v (yt+1) + v (yt+2)
(1 + δ)2
+ ...
¸
=
v (Nt)
δ
+
1
δ
∞P
j=1
Et
∙
v (yt+j)
(1 + δ)j−1
¸
We need to calculate an expression for Et [v (yt+j)] . We keep the same
probabilistic structure as in Barberis et all (1998):
Et [v (yt+j) | φt] = yt Pr (yt+j = yt | φt) + (−yt) (1 + 2l) Pr (yt+j = −yt | φt) if yt = y−yt Pr (yt+j = −yt | φt) + (yt) (1 + 2l) Pr (yt+j = yt | φt) if yt = −y
where:
Pr (yt+j = yt | φt) = Pr (yt+j = yt, st+j = 1 | φt)+Pr (yt+j = yt, st+j = 2 | φt) =
qt+j1 + q
t+j
3
Pr (yt+j = −yt | φt) = Pr (yt+j = −yt, st+j = 1 | φt)+Pr (yt+j = −yt, st+j = 2 | φt) =
qt+j2 + q
t+j
4
where we denote as qt+j =
¡
qt+j1 , q
t+j
2 , q
t+j
3 , q
t+j
4
¢0
and φt denotes the infor-
mation owned by the investor at date t that consists of all past observations
of earnings
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We note that
qt+j = Qqt+j−1 = Qjqt
where
Q0 =
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) (1− λ1)πL (1− λ1) (1− πL) λ1πH λ1 (1− πH)
(2) (1− λ1) (1− πL) (1− λ1)πL λ1 (1− πH) λ1πH
(3) λ2πL λ2 (1− πL) (1− λ2)πH (1− λ2) (1− πH)
(4) λ2 (1− πL) λ2πL (1− λ2) (1− πH) (1− λ2) πH
qt =
qt
0
1− qt
0
and qt = Pr (st = 1 | yt, yt−1, qt−1)
The probability structure of the model is recursive, since the probability
of earnings shock at date t+ j is given by the probability of earnings shock
at date t times the transition matrix to j-th power.
In particular, we can rewrite
Pr (yt+j = yt | φt) = qt+j1 + qt+j3 = γ0qt+j
Pr (yt+j = −yt | φt) = qt+j2 + qt+j4 = γ0qt+j
where γ0 = (1, 0, 1, 0) and γ0 = (0, 1, 0, 1)
We have that the expected utility of earnings at date t+ j is given by the
following expression:
Et [v (yt+j) | φt] = ytγ0Qjqt − yt (1 + 2l) γ0Qjqt if yt > 0
Et [v (yt+j) | φt] = yt (1 + 2l) γ0Qjqt − ytγ0Qjqt if yt < 0
Therefore:
PPTt =
v (Nt)
δ
+ yt (p1 − p2qt)− 2lyt
¡
p
0
1 − p
0
2qt
¢
if yt > 0
PPTt =
v (Nt)
δ
+ yt (p1 − p2qt) + 2lyt
¡
p
00
1 − p
00
2qt
¢
if yt < 0
where p1 and p2 are given by the following two expressions:
p1 =
1
δ
¡
γ00 (1 + δ) [I (1 + δ)−Q]
−1Qγ1
¢
p2 = −
1
δ
¡
γ00 (1 + δ) [I (1 + δ)−Q]
−1Qγ2
¢
where:
γ00 = (1,−1, 1,−1),
γ01 = (0, 0, 1, 0),
γ02 = (1, 0,−1, 0).
where p01 and p
0
2 are given by the following two expressions:
p01 =
1
δ
¡
γ0 (1 + δ) [I (1 + δ)−Q]−1Qγ1
¢
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p02 = −
1
δ
¡
γ0 (1 + δ) [I (1 + δ)−Q]−1Qγ2
¢
where p001 and p
00
2 are given by the following two expressions:
p001 =
1
δ
¡
γ0 (1 + δ) [I (1 + δ)−Q]−1Qγ1
¢
p002 = −
1
δ
¡
γ0 (1 + δ) [I (1 + δ)−Q]−1Qγ2
¢
Proof. of Proposition 4.We need to calculate the function
f (q) = Et
¡
PPTt+1 − PPTt | yt = +y, qt = q
¢
−Et
¡
PPTt+1 − PPTt | yt = −y, qt = q
¢
As noticed above, PPTt corresponds to P
RN
t plus a bias due to loss aver-
sion. Therefore, the first part of the analysis corresponds quasi entirely to
the one produced in Barberis et all (1998)9, where:
PRNt+1−PRNt =
v (yt+1)
δ
+(yt+1 − yt) (p1 − p2qt)−ytp2 (qt−1 − qt)−(yt+1 − yt) p2 (qt+1 − qt)
In expectations:
Et
¡
PRNt+1 − PRNt | yt = +y, qt = q
¢
= 1
2
ny
δ
+ yp2∆ (q)
o
+
+1
2
½
−(1 + 2l) y
δ
− 2y (p1 − p2q)− yp2∆ (q) + 2yp2∆ (q)
¾
=
= 1
2
yp2
¡
∆ (q) +∆ (q)
¢
+ y (p2q − p1)−
ly
δ
Et
¡
PRNt+1 − PRNt | yt = −y, qt = q
¢
= 1
2
ny
δ
+ 2y (p1 − p2q) + yp2∆ (q) + 2yp2∆ (q)
o
+
+1
2
½
−(1 + 2l) y
δ
− yp2∆ (q)+
¾
=
= y (p1 − p2q)− 12yp2
¡
∆ (q) +∆ (q)
¢
− ly
δ
Then;
f1 (q) =
¡
PRNt+1 − PRNt | yt = +y, qt = q
¢
−
¡
PRNt+1 − PRNt | yt = −y, qt = q
¢
=
2y (p2q − p1) + yp2
¡
∆ (q) +∆ (q)
¢
We need to evaluate the diﬀerence in the bias due to loss aversion. Label
it as f2 (q) . As before we need to distinguish between two cases:
yt > 0: we need to distinguish between:
yt+1 = yt = +y > 0 same sign
−2l [yt+1 (p01 − p02qt+1)− yt (p01 − p02qt)] =
= −2l [(yt+1 − yt) (p01 − p02qt)− ytp02 (qt+1 − qt)− (yt+1 − yt) p02 (qt+1 − qt)]
In expectations: this happens with probability 1
2
it becomes: −lyp02∆ (q)
yt+1 = −y; yt = +y opposite sign
9except for the evaluation of
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2l
£
yt+1
¡
p001 − p
00
2qt+1
¢
+ yt (p01 − p02qt)
¤
= 10
= 2l
£
yt+1
¡
p001 − p
00
2qt+1
¢
− yt
¡
p
00
1 − p
00
2qt
¢
+ yt
¡
p001 − p
00
2qt+1
¢
+ yt (p01 − p02qt)
¤
= 2l
∙
(yt+1 − yt)
¡
p001 − p
00
2qt
¢
− ytp
00
2 (qt+1 − qt)− (yt+1 − yt) p
00
2 (qt+1 − qt)
+yt
¡
p001 − p
00
2qt
¢
+ yt (p01 − p02qt)
¸
In expected terms, with probability 1
2
:
l
£
−2y
¡
p
00
1 − p002q
¢
− yp002∆ (q) + 2yp002∆ (q) + y
¡
p
00
1 − p002q
¢
+ y (p01 − p02q)
¤
=
= l
£
yp002∆ (q)− y (p1 − p2q)
¤
The overall term coming from l
£
−yp02∆ (q) + yp002∆ (q)− y (p1 − p2q)
¤
yt < 0: we need to distinguish between:
yt+1 = yt = −y < 0 same sign
2l [yt+1 (p001 − p002qt+1)− yt (p001 − p002qt)] =
= 2l [(yt+1 − yt) (p001 − p002qt)− ytp002 (qt+1 − qt)− (yt+1 − yt) p002 (qt+1 − qt)]
In expectations: this happens with probability 1
2
it becomes: −lyp002∆ (q)
yt+1 = +y; yt = −y opposite sign
−2l [yt+1 (p01 − p02qt+1) + yt (p001 − p002qt)] =
= −2l
£
yt+1 (p01 − p02qt+1)− yt (p01 − p02qt) + yt
¡
p001 − p
00
2qt+1
¢
+ yt (p01 − p02qt)
¤
= −2l
∙
(yt+1 − yt) (p01 − p02qt)− ytp02 (qt+1 − qt)− (yt+1 − yt) p02 (qt+1 − qt)
+yt
¡
p001 − p
00
2qt
¢
+ yt (p01 − p02qt)
¸
In expected terms, with probability 1
2
:
−l
£
2y (p01 − p02q) + yp02∆ (q)− 2yp02∆ (q)− y
¡
p
00
1 − p002q
¢
− y (p01 − p02q)
¤
=
= −l
£
−yp02∆ (q)− y (p1 − p2q)
¤
The overall term coming from −l
£
yp002∆ (q)− yp02∆ (q)− y (p1 − p2q)
¤
Summing up the two components we get:
f2 (q) = l
£
2y
¡
(p2q − p1) + yp2
£
∆ (q) +∆ (q)
¤¢¤
Therefore, the overall
fPT (q) = Et
¡
PPTt+1 − PPTt | yt = +y, qt = q
¢
−Et
¡
PPTt+1 − PPTt | yt = −y, qt = q
¢
=
f1 (q) + f2 (q)
= (1 + l)
©
2y
¡
(p2q − p1) + yp2
£
∆ (q) +∆ (q)
¤¢ª
= (1 + l) f1 (q)
As shown, the function fPT (q) is equal to the f1 (q) times a positive
costant function of the disappointment parameter. It follows that the analysis
of the conditions under which fPT (q) exhibits underreaction and overreaction
corresponds to f1 (q) exhibits underreaction and overreaction, as stated in
Barberis et all (1998).
Proof. of Proposition 6. The proof comes obviously by comparing
the security price under standard assumption of risk neutrality (according to
10We use the fact that pi = p00i − p0i where i = 1, 2
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Barberis et all (1998)) and under prospect theory.
Let us denote with PRN the security price evaluated by a risk neutral
investor with the same beliefs of the investor considered here. In particular,
we note that according to Barberis et all:
PRNt =
Nt
δ
+ yt (p1 − p2qt) (15)
The security price deviates systematically from the correct value due to
the bias caused by the attitude of loss aversion exhibited by the agent. By a
direct comparison, it follows straightly:
PPTt − PRNt =
v (Nt)−Nt
δ
− 2lyt
³
p
0
1 − p
0
2qt
´
if yt > 0 (16)
PPTt − PRNt =
v (Nt)−Nt
δ
+ 2lyt
³
p
00
1 − p
00
2qt
´
if yt < 0 (17)
Both 16 and 17 depend on the condition on underreaction and overreac-
tion. Note that v (Nt) − Nt ≤ 0, because of the particular functional form
chosen for prospect utility function. Assume for simplicity Nt = 0. Note that
the term premultiplying
³
p
i
1 − p
i
2qt
´
is negative both when a negative or a
positive shock occurs. It follows immediately that for each yt , i.e. indepen-
dently of whether a positive or negative shock occurs, PPTt is undervalued
with respect to the case of a risk neutral investor.
Proof. of Proposition 7. Within this setting with one representative
investor, the security price is given by the expected discounted value of util-
ity of future earnings, in other words: Pt = Et
(
∞P
j=1
v (Nt+j)
(1 + δ)j
)
. Given the
assumption on the utility function describing investor’s preference over earn-
ings, we cannot rely on the additivity over the stochastic shocks yt as in the
previous section. We need to determine an expression of Nt+j. Because of
the stochastic process driving earnings, we can write:
Nt+j = Nt + yt+1 + yt+2 + ...+ yt+j
We assume Nt = 0 for simplicity. Since Nt+j. is the sum of j-th shocks,
which can only take two values, +y and −y,
Nt+j = kyt + (j − k) (−yt)
where k indicates the number of same-sign shocks occurred and j− k the
number of shocks with opposite sign with respect to yt.
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Recalling:
Pr (yt+j = yt | φt) = qt+j1 + qt+j3 = γ0Qjqt
Pr (yt+j = −yt | φt) = qt+j2 + qt+j4 = γ0Qjqt
then Pr ob (Nt+j = kyt + (j − k) (−yt)) =
¡j
k
¢ kQ
i=1
(γ0Qiqt)
jQ
i=k+1
¡
γ0Qjqt
¢
since there are
¡j
k
¢
times to combine k same sign shocks.
Hence, it follows straightly the security price function:
Pt =
∞P
j=1
jP
k=0
(−λ)I [kyt + (j − k) (−yt)]α
(1 + δ)j
· ¡jk¢µ kQ
i=1
γ0Qiqt
¶µ
j+1Q
i=k+1
γ0Qiqt
¶
where
Q
(·) equals 1 when i < k or j > k.
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